
The E3/EU-Iran Initiative: Model of a progressive core within the transatlantic community?

Presentation at the conference
“Rebuilding Transatlantic Relations”
organized by the Akademie für politische Bildung Tutzing
in cooperation with the US Consulate General Munich


Outline

1. The argument: the E3 as a minilateralism
2. The Iranian challenge to the international nuclear order
3. The track record: the EU-3 as a progressive core
4. Conclusion

The Argument

1. The E3/EU mediation initiative (2003-2005) was based on a „consensus to defer“ between Washington and Tehran. When that consensus broke down, the mediation effort died.
2. The E3/EU initiative stands for a growing number of „minilateralisms“. They are niche phenoma of a highly institutionalized word order.
3. Minilateralism do have advantages vis-á-vis formal institution, i.e. IAEA Board of Governors, because of their small size and confidentiality.
4. Minilateralisms can complement formal institutions, which have lost (to varying degrees) the trust of key members, or they can even compete with these institutions.

The Iranian Nuclear (Weapons) Program 1970-2006



Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, Commander-in-Chief Iranian Armed Forces in October 1988

“With regard to chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons training, it was made very clear during the war that these weapons are very decisive. It was also made clear that the moral teachings of the world are not very effective when war reaches a serious stage and the world does not respect its own resolutions and closes its eyes to the violations and all the aggressions which are committed in the battlefield. **We should fully equip ourselves both in the offensive and defensive use of chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons. From now on you should make use of the opportunity and perform this task** (cited in Cirincione et al. 2005: 298).

Motives for an Iranian Nuclear Weapons Program

1. Iran has traditionally claimed a preponderant position in the region.
 2. Most Iranian policy makers view the „unlimited civilian use“ of nuclear technology as an inherent right and source of national prestige.
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3. Historically Iran has had strained relations with its neighbors (Turkey, Iraq, Gulf States, Saudi-Arabia)
 4. Iran is enclosed by Nuclear weapon states (Russia, Israel, Pakistan) or US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan with N-Weapons potential.
 5. Iran has no diplomatic relations with Israel and has repeatedly denied its right of existence. As a consequence several Israeli policy makers have called for military measures against an „Iranian nuclear weapons Option“.
 6. The US government has declared Iran a member state of the „axis of evil“, which must be prevented from acquiring WMD. Since 2001 several hundred thousand US troops have been deployed closer to Iranian territory.


Status

Security concerns

Unresolved Issues, IAEA-Iran-Report, 27. 02 2006


Issue	Weapons related
Additional Information on the specific enrichment questions and PU-experiments (Para. 6)	low
Original Source of radioactive particles (HEU/LEUI) (Para. 8/9)	medium
Origin and Documentation of P-1 Centrifuge technology (Para. 11-17)	medium
Potential Import of P-2-Components + ring magnets (Para. 18f)	medium
Origin and Application of converting uranium metal into hemispherical spheres (Para. 20)	high
Aim and scope of PU-experiments (Para. 23-26) and Polonium and Beryllium experiments (Para. 27)	high
Scope and nature of Enrichments and conversion activities at the Lavizan-Shian site (Para. 33-36)	medium
Aim and scope of conversion of U-dioxid in UF4 (Green Salt Proj.; Para. 38)	high
Test of expolsives and Aim of design for a ballistic missile re-entry vehicle (Para. 38)	high

Nuclear Weapons: Uranium + PU production (current status of the Iranian program)



Russian Solution: Splitting up the fuel cycle

Russia



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